My research focuses on how people represent and learn causal knowledge. My primary questions are evelopmental ones: how do young childrenrepresent causal structure and learn new pieces of causal knowledge from sparse information in the world? Are the processes that young children use the same or different from adults?

I have two approaches to studying causal reasoning. In one line of research, I am interested in the representation and mechanism adults and children use for causal learning. With my collaborators, I have suggested that a particular computational model, causal Bayes nets, provide a description of the representation of causal knowledge, and algorithms within this framework provide a description of how causal knowledge is acquired. I have found that young children and infants reason according to certain formal principles that define these models. I have also demonstrated that preschoolers (and adults) use particular a particular algorithm within this framework to guide their causal learning. Further, my research on this topic has investigated children's counterfactual reasoning, adults' reasoning about interventions and hypothesis testing, children's and adults' inferences about hidden causes, and children's and adults' use of causal knowledge to make category judgments.

The second approach I have taken is to concentrate on a domain of knowledge and map out children's understanding of the causal structure of that domain. I have focused on folk psychology, and in particular, children's understanding of pretense. With my collaborators, I have found that young children often do not understand causal relations involving pretense even through they engage in pretend play at an early age. However, children's understanding does improve when questions about pretense are asked in a fantasy context. My current research explores why fantasy improves children's performance. This research also attempts to relate children's knowledge about pretense to their broader causal reasoning abilities.

Recently, I have started a project mapping out children's understanding of the causal structure of the mental state 'learning'. Like pretending, understanding the causal structure of learning involves incorporating various mental states together. When and how do children understand learning events? Do children represent this knowledge using the formal mechanisms described above? Is their understanding of learning events related to their ability to learn?

Sobel, D. M. (2004). Children's developing knowledge of the relation between mental awareness and pretense. Child Development, 75, 704-729.

Sobel, D. M., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Gopnik, A. (2004). Children's causal inferences from indirect evidence: Backwards blocking and Bayesian reasoning in preschoolers. Cognitive Science, 28, 303-333.

Sobel, D. M. (2004). Exploring the coherence of young children's explanatory abilities: Evidence from generating counterfactuals. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 22, 37-58.

Gopnik, A. Glymour, C., Sobel, D. M., and others. (2004). A theory of causal learning in children: Causal maps and Bayes nets. Psychological Review, 111, 1-30.

Sobel, D. M. & Lillard, A. S. (2002). Young children's understanding of pretense: Do words bend the truth? Developmental Science, 5, 87-97.